/SIDELONG

Open Music for Lost Futures.

Threshold Theorists

What I want to do here is bring together two theorists of the 1980s-90s who took up the necessary but formidable task of understanding the world in flux, of identifying in real-time the great change that had come and swept everyone up.

One of these theorists is David Harvey, who understood this as a great transformation in political economy as the Fordist-Keynesian model (or, the New Deal Order) that prevailed between the 1930s and 1960s gave way to the Post-Fordist-Neoliberal model (or, the Neoliberal Order) of the 1980s to 2020s. More on this shortly.

The other theorist is David Toop, who understood this as a great transformation in artistic expression as the long-simmering potential of “open music” raged suddenly to a boil. Open music is Toop’s term for the artistic orientation taken up during moments of cultural exchange, from the colonial expeditions and expositions that shocked Europe with the myths and music of other cultures to the profound and permanent exchange unique to the interconnected and globalized digital age of the 1980s onward.

Taken together, these two threshold theorists let us consider the world that gave rise to open music, and thus to ambient music.

By the 2000s, the material transformations Harvey and Toop identified had been firmly established as the status quo. A mood of permanence then pervaded society, one only deepened when the Global Financial Crisis failed to generate the kind of reform such crises historically yielded. This is the world in which Mark Fisher, our third theorist, though one of stasis rather than thresholds, popularized those concepts and phrases so central to 2000s and 2010s culture, from hauntology to “the slow cancellation of the future.”

How do we get from Brian Eno’s sunny airport concourses in 1978 to The Caretaker’s drones of disordered and deteriorating memory in 2000 or The Black Dog’s canticles for neoliberal non-places in 2010?

Here, I’ll try to tie these three theorists together so we can begin tracing the development of open music from Toop’s day into Fisher’s and then our own. But before we can do that, we’ll need to take a short detour into the philosophy of history.

Three Claims About History

Whenever I write about ambient music, I realize I’m really writing about the world that gave rise to it. So quickly when we talk about art is a theory of history either consciously asserted or unconsciously smuggled in. And of course it is. Art is in and of history. It can build itself only of the resources readily at hand, can blossom only out of the immediate world that is its precondition. So it takes the present world to get to art, and so we can arrive through art back at the present world, and perhaps know something more of its many hidden faces.

This project rests on a theory of history that I’ll attempt to summarize in three brisk points. We’ll then see each of these at work as we trace the dramatic transformation, nothing short of a revolution in global political economy, which gave rise to ambient music, or broader still “open music,” in David Toop, David Harvey, and Mark Fisher.

The three claims are:

I. We’re barreling into the future with eyes closed and backs turned. That is to say, things happen to us far before we understand them. We would like to slow down and take an account of it, but the world will not wait for us. We’re blown “irresistibly into the future,” as Walter Benjamin tells us, “while the rubble heap... grows sky high.” This is our “perennial emergency,” one we’re more likely to repress or disavow than accept because its implications are profound.

II. So, there’s an ongoing task to catch our understanding up to the world always outpacing it. That is to say, there is a continuous need to produce fresh theory adequate to the fresh developments of society. This is less a task we employ ourselves in and more a spontaneous human behavior akin to dreaming. Each transformation in society, then, has its theoretical and artistic expressions. This is less a claim of hard determinism and more a claim that individual and collective agency is exercised within a field of constraints and affordances that those agents cannot immediately change.

III. Art, then, plays a meaningful but complex role in the elucidation of the present and the cause for the future. It’s in art that the discontents and desires and self-understandings of society, not just individuals, are expressed. And they will not be expressed perfectly. So art is dubious, sometimes even dishonest; yet it can tell no lies. Even the most reactionary and uncritical piece of art cannot help but give us truth, if we know how to find it, because it will say more about the creator than they can say about themselves, will reveal more about their moment than it can know of itself. (For instance, a piece of popular culture that believes its own fictions speaks to conditions in which those fictions are desirable, necessary, or otherwise shared by the public at the level of wish-fantasy. This tells us plenty.)

Art is the sincere blossom of history. We can appreciate its beauty, and then we can inquire about what conditions gave rise to it. In doing so, we learn something of our own conditions, of our shared predicament. This dignifies the critical-historical component of art that occurs whether or not the artist intends it.

Open Music: “As Above...”

In a foreword to a later edition of Ocean of Sound, first published in 1995, an older Toop regrets his book’s initial optimism. His excitement was less for the changing world and more for the open field of artistic potential it yielded: an “ethereal culture absorbed in perfume, light, silence, and ambient sound,” where suddenly “the sound object, represented most dramatically by the romantic symphonies of the nineteenth century,” was “fractured and remade into a shifting, open lattice on which new ideas can hang, or through which they can pass and interweave.”

For Toop, this was “open music,” an artistic orientation historically taken up, in fits and starts, during moments of sudden cultural exchange, such as those glimpsed in the late 19th and early 20th century expeditions and expositions that introduced Europeans to the music and myths of Java and Bali and Morocco.

These cultural encounters lit a flame in such consequential musicians as Debussy, whose encounter with Javanese water myths so inspired his radical liquid piano works. Or with the European colonizers experiencing “gamelan,” those multi-day percussion events that were more “environments like moonlight over a field” than note-based songs, which would go on to inspire the American Minimalists, such as Philip Glass and Steve Reich.

In the late-20th century, this artistic orientation of “open music” was, for the first time, explosively and durably realized. Globalization and the digital age created unprecedented levels of sustained cultural exchange, all shot through, of course, with the ambivalent character of cross-cultural influence, being at once colonial and cosmopolitan, exploitative and nourishing.

Yet for all of Toop’s prescience, he had not sufficiently registered the more ambivalent transformation in the world’s political economy that gave rise to this new artistic expression. Instead, he placed explanatory primacy on the “intangibility of twentieth-century communications,” the replacement of clunky analog apparatuses with two-dimensional icons, of shelves of physical audio equipment with digital software, of the sudden possibility of instant global communication.

Only in an all-too-brief sentence, tucked away near the end of the book, does Toop mention that “industrial-era hard labour appears to be disappearing” too. (Toop, something of a fellow traveler, winks as he writes, “All that is solid melts into aether,“ but the historical materialist analysis stops there.)

Yet Ocean of Sound gave me the sense that, far from a sudden break, when Brian Eno inaugurated ambient music in 1978 with his liner-note manifesto, which I discuss in The Ends of Ambient Music, he acted less as an individual creator and more as a midwife of something long gestating within this lineage.

So open music was less a conscious artistic choice independently arrived at by many individual artists, and more a tinge or haze or orientation ripening in the new world, through which art was expressed, one that wasn’t contained to experimental genres but that finds expression across genres. This is the mark of historical necessity: vast largely non-conscious patterned behavior is a sign that some broader current is at work.

Artists, I like to think, are more like channelers than inventors. It’s available to them, before anyone else, to gesture at the “current” in its most universal (and so least descriptive) form. This type of poetic prefiguration is powerful and unwieldy (recall point three).

Post-Fordism: “...So Below”

Five years before the publication of Ocean of Sound, David Harvey published The Condition of Postmodernity. Where Toop poetically anticipates the digital age as one in which “mankind... can be compared with dolphins or whales in a new kind of sea,” Harvey gives us the history and political economy necessary to understand the more thoroughgoing transition taking place.

Where Toop identifies a future music that will “hybridise hybrids” and “grasp at the transparency of water” created by “telematic nomads,” Harvey identifies a new liquidity in the labor process, of the fragmentation of work into a nomadic gig and hustle economy, of shorter contracts negotiated across larger geographical distances, of heightened international capital “flows” in a great interpenetration that old-world capital controls had made impossible.

Harvey recognized that the old “regime of accumulation,” the New Deal’s of state-sanctioned unionization, market intervention, and social protections borne of the Great Depression necessitating a “new deal” struck between capital and labor, was breaking up and giving rise to a new one. He would later call it neoliberalism, but at the time preferred “flexible accumulation.”

To greatly abridge things, I'll provide an overview of my |SOLIDAIR Gary Gerstle lecture on “Protean Character of American Liberalism,” which covers the political movements that oversaw these periods:

I. Progressive Liberalism

The liberals of the early 20th century inherited the crises of the classical liberals of the 19th century: labor exploitation, bank runs, the ossification of southern racial hierarchies, and the further erosion of democracy through immense concentrations of wealth. To maintain legitimacy, liberalism would need to rearticulate itself. It did so as Progressivism, which sought to resolve the increasingly sophisticated challenges of the modern economy through increasingly sophisticated interventions through the state. It was in these conditions that the civil service was professionalized and that state capacity was deepened through new institutions like the Federal Reserve. In other words, the strong-state liberalism of the Progressives arose not to oppose capitalism but to preserve it in a time of crisis; to be more intelligent stewards of it.

II. New Deal Liberalism

Incapable of avoiding or managing the Great Depression, liberalism underwent yet another rearticulation to maintain legitimacy. Skeptical of the Progressives’ cultural interventions of “moral regeneration” and social hygiene, the New Dealer liberals raised mainly questions of economics and class. They further developed state capacity through new welfare institutions, strong regulatory policies, and the general recognition that a market isn’t “free” if its essential component, labor (all who work to live), has no means of advocating for its own interests, just as capital could. Rather than advance beyond the polarization of capital and labor (that is, to deepen merely political democracy into political and economic democracy), they brokered a compromise between capital and labor. So the New Deal order would be characterized by strong-state interventionism, technocratic management, labor protections, and welfarism.

III. Neoliberalism

By the time the profitability crisis in industry intensified and the stagflation of the 1970s was broken with the Volcker Shock, the New Deal order, with its Keynesian consensus overseeing industrialized Fordist conditions, had collapsed. The insurgent neoliberal order, with its monetarist consensus overseeing globalizing deindustrialized post-Fordist conditions, then arose. This was no clean break. The state wasn’t disempowered in neoliberalism so much as it was retooled: monetary policy, (de)regulation, and global financial governance would be used, but to prop up markets and open them where they didn’t yet exist (such as in the privatization of water, education, and formerly public housing), maintain police and military functions necessary to clear up embolisms to the new circuitry of “free trade” (such as to crush labor strikes, colonial liberation movements, and socialist victories abroad), and to gut the social safety net and progressive taxes undergirding the longest period of the lowest wealth inequality of American history, which has since rapidly been inverted.

And so the New Deal stability of yesterday, unpleasant and insufficient as it was, gave way to the post-Fordist precarity of today, with its shorter-term contracts negotiated over greater geographical distances, its “always hustling” ethos of stimulants and side-gigs, the normalization of debt and specialization resting uneasily against the declining affordability of the American dream, the failures of the political system subsidized increasingly by atomized personal distress and one’s own “entrepreneurial spirit.” (And there is now talk of post-neoliberalism; see my |SOLIDAIR Chris Cutrone lecture.)

There are “moods” to the prevailing political-economic orders in which we are born and over which, absent a class-conscious independent socialist party, we have no control. At a time where such a party seems impossible, where even the country’s moderate and apolitical unions have been thoroughly decimated, a widespread sense that something is off, a malaise or pang of hopelessness, is hardly unfounded.

This, to put it lightly, has an effect on people, and to blinker our vision only to its artistic impact, it also affects the kinds of things those people create.

Lost Futures: Stasis Theorists

It’s in Mark Fisher’s Capitalist Realism (2009), fourteen years after Ocean of Sound and nineteen after Condition of Postmodernity, that we get something like an assimilation of Toop’s and Harvey’s project, as well as a theory that traces the longer arc of these developments into the 2000s and 2010s. The new world Harvey and Toop had described in its early phase had for Fisher long ago established itself and matured. Yet the cultural diagnosis wasn’t one of Toopian optimism.

Fisher, as both a theorist and a popularizer of other theorists (such as Simon Reynolds, Bifo Berardi, Jacques Lacan, Slavoj Zizek, etc.), thought the material austerity of the neoliberal turn registered culturally as the feeling of a “slow cancellation of the future,” leading to a knee-jerk sentimentality for the past (”retromania”), where imagining the new was replaced by turning back and replaying the old.

Why did so many artists, he wondered, painstakingly add, as digital audio tracks no less, record crackling and tape disintegrating and the clunky warmth of old analog equipment to their songs? Fisher thought we wanted to go back to a time where there was a viable political economic, and thus artistic, alternative on offer.

At the heart of his diagnosis is the identification of a widespread malaise that gripped personal life, politics, and most importantly for our purposes, cultural production, in the 00s and 10s: “capitalist realism.” Capitalist realism is a reflexive belief that there is no alternative to a worsening status quo, that the world can only be remade in the austere neoliberal image, that the abundance of the postwar social democracies were blinking out forever, and with them, their unrealized but still-possible Left horizon, that socialist promise of freedom-from-below for the core capitalist countries and their vast subjugated periphery.

Fisher traced how this social malaise appeared in the theory and art of the time, as well as the “signature” mental afflictions of its inhabitants, such as the stimulation-exhaustion of “depressive hedonia.” (Where depressive anhedonia is an inability to experience pleasure, depressive hedonia is the inability to do anything but pursue pleasure, a powerful concept written before the omnipresence of the iPhone.) The chapter on the “reflexive impotence” of anti-consumerism and protest culture is also powerful, seeing each as momentary bouts of “carnival-esque background noise” before the status quo continues unabated.

It’s too often forgotten that, for Fisher, capitalist realism wasn’t a reality so much as the feeling or mood wafting off of the latest shape of capitalism, where even the Global Financial Crisis couldn’t muster an organized resistance capable of winning a center-left victory akin to the New Deal, let alone a more thoroughgoing Left victory in the image of an older Debsian project.

So Fisher tells us of the speed-laced 90s boom soundtracked by the “manic libidinal hunt” of jungle, of the lost futures in even the science fiction of the troubled aughts where Children of Men showed us a slow apocalypse of sterility and sameness, of the Great-Recession’s “speed comedown” through the surprising rediscovery of the post-punk depressives, Joy Division (who originally channeled, Fisher reminds us, the late 70s disintegration of the postwar consensus), and of the ascendant hauntological genre that mourned some just-missed Golden Age, like The Caretaker’s ghostly, reverb-drenched, vinyl-crackling big band tunes of a time out of joint.

Is Fisher a theorist of open music passed through the capitalist-realist haze of the 00s and 10s? When was the Toopian future lost, and when did the excitable charge turn retromaniac and hauntological, taking up as its object the non-place and “TINA” soundscape. It will take on, or has taken on, a yet new character. Will we see it? Will we learn from it?

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